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The Civilized and the Barbarous: 




From anthropological studies describing social representations of Mediterranean 
countries,2 to the outskirts of Paris,3 to the analysis of its evolution and role in 
contemporary society,4 honor holds a privileged place in humanities research. Although 
there have been a significant number of studies describing cultural differences emanating 
from this principle, honor is nonetheless a common element of various societies. While the 
term varies from one culture to another, what it designates is quite similar. 
The principle of honor confers a specific place and status to the individual, allowing her 
or him to exist in a given society. It allows individuals to situate themselves within the 
collectivity in which they evolve, prescribing codes and conducts relative to their age, sex,5 
or social status.6 Previous studies have given rise to a multitude of descriptions of honor, 
showing that this principle is present in numerous spheres of existence, but especially that it 
can take on various meanings: honor can be a “feeling,”7  an “entitlement to respect,”8 a 
combination of certain qualities such as “strength,” “courage” or “integrity,”9 the “moral 
value of an individual,”10 a moral principle and a duty,11 “an ideology,”12 or even “the need 
to attain a certain prestige within society.”13 
Honor is a complex principle that on various levels influences daily life. Often judged 
as outdated and ill-suited to modern society, honor can be seen as too rigid a concept, 
which is too “engaging” in a “liquid society.”14 However, honor cannot be abandoned 
without engendering a feeling of unease. If discussions of honor in daily life may seem 
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irrelevant to today’s world, forgoing it and living without honor remains inconceivable to 
people living in both these societies.  
The goal of this research is to understand the place of honor in today’s world, in an 
increasingly rationalized and profit-oriented world, in which individuals are characterized 
by their interchangeability. Mainly, this paper seeks to reveal how honor is expressed in 
today’s consumer society and globalized world.  
To conduct this research, I chose to analyze the honor principle in France and Turkey, 
which, although in geographical proximity, represent distinct traditions. The goal was to 
grasp the multiple understandings of honor among twenty to twenty-seven-year-olds in 
these two societies, focusing on identifying similarities, but also differences. 
France and Turkey were chosen for comparison for specific reasons. In Turkey, three 
terms exists to describe the concept of “honor,” namely şeref, onur and namus. Although 
closely related, each term refers to different spheres; public, private and intimate.15 These 
three words are used in the everyday life and are considered by the Turkish population as 
more important than life - in Turkey, people can kill for honor, they swear “on their honor,” 
and they drink to one’s “honor.” The concept of honor seems to play a totally different role 
in French society. It is considered obsolete, harkening back to the principles of Musketeers 
and the chivalry of the Middle Ages. In short, for the French population, this term tends to 
be poorly suited for life in modern society. Starting from this observation, this paper shall 
analyze the divergences of these two perceptions. For the purpose of this paper, honor shall 
be represented by the concepts of “honneur” in French and “şeref” in Turkish, which seem 
to share similar denotations. 
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The basis of this research is informal interviews were that conducted with young adults, 
between the ages of twenty and twenty-seven-years-old. This age group offered the 
opportunity to study the transformation of this principle.  The Turkish young adults 
interviewed for this research were born in the 1980s, a period during which the country 
open its borders to foreign products. A liberal market emerged, having a huge impact on 
society. This generation grew up in a context in which the Turkish, the foreign, and market 
values all existed together. Life for these adults is now characterized by its apolitical nature 
and a lifestyle based on unrestrained consumerism.16 
By looking at the 1980s generation of French people, it is possible to note similar 
transformations. These young people’s lives have been changed not only by social and 
economic factors, but by a general transformation that also occurred as wealth and 
production migrated to newly industrializing economies. The spread of technology and 
popular culture metamorphosed the habits of this generation. In France, this age group grew 
up in a society characterized by its political and social instability, causing a high rate of 
unemployment, and engendered by the ideology of 1980’s, “neoliberalism.” In 1981, in an 
attempt to lower unemployment, the French government’s priority was to help companies 
become profitable and to encourage investment. France entered into a period of austerity, 
which the French population had no other choice but to accept. In the 1990s, the economic 
situation changed, and diverse categories of “have-nots” (such as the unemployed, the 
homeless and undocumented immigrants), who were until then considered victims of 
capitalism, stood up for their rights. This period was characterized by important 
movements, which tried to question the nature of the capitalist system. 
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The insecurity provoked by this social instability led to the dependence of the youth on the 
older generation. For example, numerous young adults still live with their parents and 
depend on them financially. In France, this population represented 11.6 percent of the 
twenty-five to thirty-four-year-olds in 2011, although they were only 8 percent in 2007.17 
True, it seems that this phenomenon is not only prevalent among French young adults: the 
2012 ING International Survey on Homes and Mortgages18 found moving back home was 
also prevalent in Turkey, Romania, Italy and Spain. The American crisis of subprime 
mortgages also intensified this global phenomenon. New terminology emerged to describe 
this group of young adults remaining in the parental home for extended periods; generation 
“boomerang,” “kangaroo,” “hotel Mama” or “altricial,” referring to a species of birds who 
are born blind and helpless, depending completely on their parents for warmth and food 
until they have developed enough to leave the nest. This generation has then lived with the 
consequences of the economical, social and political transitions of their generation. They 
grew up in a world characterized by planétarisation,19 in which individuals have to adapt 
themselves to a rationalized world, focused upon profit. 
 The aim of this study is to see how French and Turkish people born between 1980 
and 1990 have adjusted the social expectations imposed by honor (such as restraint and 
constancy) to those dictated by the merchandise society based on exacerbate flexibility. 
To conduct this research, a convenience sample was utilized, which allowed the gathering 
of various representations of honor, and also an understanding the prevailing variations of 
the concept. The concern was not to set criteria which may have led to a biased analysis; for 
example, selecting a randomly drawn sample of people living in a specific quarter of 
Istanbul or Paris may have seemed appropriate from a methodological standpoint, but 
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wrong from a demographic standpoint, as the sample may not have been be representative 
of a cross-section of Turkish or French populations. Defining additional criteria for this 
research would have been problematic as honor is relevant to everybody, without any 
distinction of race for example. To conduct this research, fifty men and fifty women in each 
society were interviewed. All of our interviewees were city-dwellers, aged twenty to 
twenty-seven-years-old, university students and graduates, born, raised, and currently living 
in Istanbul, or in the Ile-de-France region, which includes Paris. The present sample, while 
not representative of these two entire populations, provides a large panel of “exemplary 
cases,” allowing us to analyze honor as a personal, but also in certain cases, as a cohesive 
principle. The results of this study show that in these two different societies, the concept of 
honor for young adults tended to share similarities, most likely due to globalization. The 
“planetarisation” seems to have redefined the interactions and the social values, and 
standardized the concept of honor.  These interviews offer great insight into how 
individuals view the honor principle today, as well as how this may be a principle of 
resistance to contemporary barbarism.  
Honor as a Self-Imposed Principle 
Whether honneur in France, or şeref in Turkey, the interviewees described honor as a 
principle imposing on individuals guidelines for their behavior. To the French, honor 
appears to be a significant personal principle: a set of values that allows for the preservation 
of one’s integrity. Honor is a line of conduct and morality in which the individual believes, 
and to which he or she conforms as a guideline for his or her existence. In spite of its 
importance, young French adults seem to prefer to use other terms in their daily life, such 
as “dignity,” “self-esteem,” “pride,” and “integrity,” rather than to speak of honor: for 
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them, this concept is a “grand word” imbued with commitments, ill-suited to the modern 
world, which advocates detachment. However, a vast majority of respondents indicated that 
honor gives the individual lines of conduct that should not be ignored, so as not to lose 
one’s self-respect. 
In Turkey, şeref has also been perceived as a principle which gives meaning to our 
actions. For respondents, it tends to comfort us in our existence and even confirm our place 
within society. If having şeref is not an ultimate goal, or even a principle to which the 
individual often refers, it must be perpetuated and intertwined with existence itself. “Şeref 
is what allows us to live,” “Şeref is above everything else,” “Şeref is more important than 
life,” are common statements heard among Turkey’s young adults.  Similarly, it goes 
beyond the two other terms for honor: namus and onur, which signify respectively virtue-
honor and dignity. 
However, it is impossible to consider honor without taking into account its interactional 
dimension: all principles cited by French and Turkish interviewees are synonyms for honor 
and şeref, such as “respect for others,” “solidarity,” “loyalty,” “doing what you are told,” 
“do what you say you’ll do,” and “keep promises.” These represent principles essentially 
turned towards otherness and the correct functioning of social relations. Honor is 
inseparable from public space;20 it corresponds to “face” and to self-performance21 in order 
to be recognized. In daily-life, individuals develop and define their honor based on shared 
social norms. They adapt themselves to rules of living, manners, and judge each other by 
these same criteria. Honor is inseparable from judgment as it is the moral value which 
individual possess in the eyes of society to which they belong.22 
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Honor must be considered as something personal and political. To avoid any negative 
judgment of one’s actions, morals and intentions, as well as the tarnishing of one’s 
reputation, the individual must restrain gestures and words; he or she must self-constrain23 
to demonstrate their knowledge of the rules of civility,24 and to entitle them to the respect 
and consideration of peers. This self-imposition aimed at recognition is far from superficial: 
rules of living are essential for society to function. They regulate relations, while imposing 
forms and manners25 allowing each person to respect interactional distances. Each 
individual imposes her or himself as a complete member of society, with rights and duties 
towards oneself, but also towards others; each can expect consideration and require 
recognition of one’s own value. This means that every individual has the right, as an ethical 
necessity, to minimal recognition. For this, each must respect others as much as he or she 
wishes to be respected.26 Each person is responsible for maintaining this equilibrium in 
societal relations, through the government of self and others. Only if each person commits 
to respecting manners in society, to contain impulses, and through this to possess honor, 
social order can only be perpetuated. 
Honor and şeref dictate to individuals certain required behaviors - they must be modest, 
discreet, humble, avoid any exhibition, and not be ostentatious.27 In her research, Marie-
Luce Gélard shows how the vocabulary of honor can vary according to gender. The words 
concerning women’s honor evoke an honor closed in on itself (remain a girl, keep one’s 
honor), whereas that of men is turned towards the outside world (face the world, show who 
you are). Both are expected not to be slaves to their impulses, to channel their passions, and 
overall, to exercise exemplary conduct, in order to correspond to a super-human model. 
Portrayals of honor take root in the body itself: it can be seen as much in the head, which 
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must be bowed as a sign of deference or covered to hide any sign of femininity, as in the 
genitals, but also in the face, hands, blood. Is it not the biggest mark of disapproval situated 
in the “arm of Honor” (“Bras d’honneur”) in some countries, and “the finger” in others? 
Honor has a privileged link with the body, as much in self-performance as in self-
governing.28 Moreover, public honor signifies the progression from the simple affirmation 
of presence, to the elaboration of presentation, displaying the art of living, to one’s grasp on 
politeness, decorum and manners. In order to correspond to precepts dictated by honor, the 
body must be controlled, constrained, tamed and trained, and this must be reflected in the 
body’s extension, that is, how it is dressed. The body and its impulses must be dominated, 
because through the body, individuals take their place in the world, situating themselves 
with regards to the otherness that recognizes them. Through self-constraint, individuals 
prove their good manners, which imply that they are virtuous (and therefore honorable). In 
this way, they gain the respect of their peers. Honor and şeref are necessary as personal 
principles, geared towards the social recognition of others, made possible through self-
control of body and impulses. For respondents, this meant a principle of containment and 
restraint, forming a civic honor which attempts to be “civilized”.  
Although interviewees affirmed that their own honor depended upon restraint and 
containment, they tended to refer to another type of honor that they qualified as 
“barbarous,” and impulsive. In their eyes, this belonged to populations with which they did 
not share the same vision of honor.29 This could signify populations, cultures, or even entire 
“stranger” civilizations.  
For Turkish respondents, “barbarous” honor brought to mind three distinct practices 
with which they did not identify. The first practice young Turks considered barbarous is 
8
International Social Science Review, Vol. 89 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol89/iss1/2
honor killings (namus cinayetleri), aimed at cleansing any offence to virtue-honor, and 
called namus in Turkish. These crimes are notably perpetrated in order to punish woman 
who have extramarital relations, or a men who question a woman’s virtue.30  
Barbarous honor is also, for young Turks, associated with crimes of customs (tore 
cinayetleri). These are committed when an individual breaks the rules of their collectivity. 
For example, refusing to marry according to a decision made by other members of the 
community would be a crime of customs. By doing so, the individual puts into question not 
only his or her family’s honor, but also the entire system of tradition and custom to which 
individuals are bound. Family members designate a family member who must eliminate the 
perturbing individual according to this collectivity’s own rules. 
The final barbarous type of honor as identified by young Turks is the vendetta (kan 
davası). This refers to relations between families for whom ancestral vengeances persist. 
The individual must avenge family honor in responding to the collectivity’s expectations.31 
Through such actions, courage, belonging, and dutifulness are proven. Hesnard has referred 
to this as “self-affirmation through negation of the other”.32 
For Turkish respondents, these three practices reflect “barbarous” honor. These 
practices can be seen in south-east Turkey, which belong to “another time” for the 
respondents. For them, they do not correspond to values promoted by society, in particular 
to the notion of gender equality, nor do they adhere to the very definition of honor itself. 
Honor is a principle that attempts to be personal and subjective, and not determined 
exclusively by outside laws. More significantly, these practices ruffle the established social 
order, since they establish themselves based on local, communitarian rules that question the 
country’s official laws. In addition (still according to respondents), populations practicing 
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crimes in the name of honor are slaves to their impulses: they do not demonstrate self-
constraint, nor respect for others, principles which are at the core of honor. Young adults go 
as far as to designate these populations as “individuals ruled by their impulses,” 
“barbarians,” or even “monsters.” 
In addition to its impulsive aspect, respondents noted that “impulsive honor” stems 
from individuals illiteracy and lack of education. As Banu, a twenty-seven-year-old woman 
from Turkey said, “Those who do it, they do it out of habit. They lack education and so 
they believe in values from another time, from the past, which they attempt to apply to the 
20th century. Maybe I shouldn’t judge them on a social level, since they do not have the 
same values, the same education. But they should stop killing each other.” When a twenty-
seven-year-old man in Turkey named Tamer was asked, “But why do they kill?” his 
response was, “There is no reason. They kill because of namus. They kill the one who has 
tarnished namus. I don’t know anyone who has practiced töre. It comes from a lack of 
education, since we don’t see it among educated people like us.” 
Young adults used the term “education” to mean not only scholastic knowledge, but 
also manners, codes of behavior, and ways of being in society. In affirming that people who 
practice honor crimes were “without education,” respondents implied that they were 
characterized both by lack of schooling and an absence of manners. They were thus thought 
to be individuals mastering neither codes of collective living, nor their own bodies; they 
refuse self-constraint imposed by societal rules and are guided by their impulses, which 
could often lead to crime. This confusion between civility and knowledge was very 
significant, since it shows that the individual who does not correspond to these expectations 
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has no place in the public sphere, and represents a danger and an annoyance, due to a lack 
of “right” visions of the world and “right” conduct characteristic of honor. 
In France, “barbarous” and violent honor were also designated as a principle belonging 
to “othernesses,” with which respondents claimed not to identify. Here, “barbarous” honor 
was characterized as excessive, exteriorized, with rigid honor present in every situation. 
Behaviors associated with “barbarous” honor were considered in total opposition to the 
type of characteristics advocated by respondents, notably, reserve and restraint. Although it 
was not a question of honor crimes as in Turkey (such practices being mostly unknown to 
French interviewees), numerous alterities designated as exercising violent honor were cited. 
French respondents associated these ideas with different ethnic groups. For example, the 
interviewees had opinions about populations they described as Mediterranean. Denis, a 
twenty-six-year-old male commented, “It sounds particularly Mediterranean: warm blood 
to avenge family honor, they are ready to use any means at their disposal to kill, to defend 
this honor in any situation.” They also associated these behaviors with African cultures.  
Nathan, a twenty-six- year-old man in France noted, “Actually, if someone kills for honor, 
it’s an Honor crime. Genocide in Rwanda was against humanity, but for honor, since the 
Hutus put their hearts into it.” Many also had associated this negative type of honor with 
Latin behavior, as twenty-three-year-old Alexandre thought this type of honor existed 
among, “…hot-blooded populations, in Latin culture, in Africa too...”  
      Michel, a twenty-seven-year-old man from France, associated this idea of honor with 
Muslim cultures, stating, “In Africa, especially with lapidating, among Muslims for 
example, because the woman slept with another, so the man must kill the woman and the 
other. OK, I think that’s horrible.” Jennifer also had preconceived notions about honor in 
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Afghanistan, saying “We saw those women in Afghanistan getting lapidated because they 
were suspected of having an affair, or did not satisfy their husbands. I think that’s 
scandalous. Today, people are still killing for honor. It’s ridiculous.”  Jennifer, a twenty-
seven-year-old woman in France, had definite opinions about Corsicans, stating “When you 
look at family vendettas, they start with the father…, and they last for generations, and 
families hate each other because someone pulled a jack-knife, or because of a neighborhood 
problem. They consider everything as a question of honor. I think that’s unrealistic. It 
means they don’t even really think. “I consider that you dishonored me, that my honor was 
shaken. So I’m killing you.” Who do they think they are, to go killing someone else?” 
         Some French respondents also associated this type of honor with other Frenchmen, 
namely the inhabitants of the suburbs (“banlieues”).  Michel, mentioned earlier, said “I 
don’t think I share the same definition of honor as those people... I take a lot of photos in 
those places and I like to talk with them, those ones who always try to attack me and rob 
me at first. OK, I think of it as dogs who sniff each others’ bottoms, they need to bark at 
each other, to show our position. But we don’t have the same honor codes at all, it’s really 
weird. I think that they are afraid of everything… of being an idiot, which is the supreme 
insult. So for them, defending their honor must be done through physical violence. Why 
not? But that’s not the right way to defend one’s honor.”  
All these dualities in the understanding of honor, apparent in French and Turkish views, 
give rise to an “Us” and a “Them,” established according to divergences in conceptions of 
honor. On the one hand, there is “civilized” honor, based on restraint in behaviors. This 
seeks to respect alterity, yet without giving much importance to its judgments. On the other 
hand, there is honor qualified as “barbarous” that is violent, destructive, constraining, 
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totally subject to others’ opinions, which relies on principles of otherness with which the 
respondents claim not to identify.  This otherness seems to have a restrictive vision of 
honor, connected to feminine sexuality and chastity, conception considered by our 
interviewees as the product of an obsolete and “outdated” mode of thinking. The young 
adults extolled a more “modern” and better adapted conception to the democratic and 
liberal society they live in. 
         These divergences in conceptions are even naturalized by geographical distinctions: 
honor crimes, most visible in southeastern Turkey, were considered by interviewees as 
practices coming from the whole Eastern region of the country and sometimes even all of 
Anatolia. These symbolic borders may imply a distinction between the conception of honor 
in Istanbul and that of, not even the southeast, but the entire “rest of Turkey.” In French 
discussions, violent honor is described as belonging to certain civilizations, cultures, 
societies, or populations – that is, highly diversified abstractions. Through these numerous 
representations of violent honor, the individual comforts his or her own honor: even while 
not allowing oneself identification with the “Other,” honor lets individuals judge each other 
and situate themselves based on this otherness.  
The Principle of Honor in Consumer Society 
     Today, new values seem to raise questions about the criteria for honor: in an 
increasingly fragmented society ruled by serial social relations, “to have honor” does not 
guarantee the individual a place in society. In this context, wherein materialism prevails, 
the individual’s personal value no longer depends on morality, but is measured by what is 
shown and what appears to be. To be and to have tend to be indistinguishable, to show what 
you have is thus to show who you are; to show the self-reduced to a self that is fragmented, 
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hacked into pieces, on display.33 Reputation is determined not according to moral precepts, 
but by the fact of being “in” or “out,” according to criteria of consumerism.  Comments 
made by many of the interviewees note this, including one from Nathan who felt that 
“Society makes it so we are honorable when we own things.” This quest for recognition 
which emphasizes being “seen” in order to be accepted corresponds to “tyranny of 
opinion.” The judgment of others determines the individual’s place in society, making him 
or her a winner or a loser.34 In addition, society is constantly creating more and more 
productivity-based requirements, making all former criteria for success quite obsolete. All 
criteria for success, and even for simple recognition, tend to be difficult to meet. Basically, 
never obtaining the conviction that one’s life has meaning, and being influenced by 
unobtainable ideals put forth by consumer society in which “excess becomes the norm,” the 
individual is submerged in “anxiety over losing one’s place, not being worthy of the ideal, 
of not knowing how to respond to paradoxical requirements…”35 
Consequently, the instability of contemporary society, and its characteristic lack of 
guidelines, submerge the individual in constant worry: faced with the fast pace of 
transformations in the surrounding world, people become aware not only that their place in 
their own society is not guaranteed, but also that their lives, even if they are stable, are not 
protected from existential upheaval. These situations of rupture have been acknowledged in 
statements of respondents regarding “crisis” and “precariousness”. Both correspond to 
situations dreaded by individuals, since they can perturb the course of their existence, and 
especially can throw them into life conditions that threaten their dignity and their integrity. 
At any moment, the tide of one’s existence can turn and plunge into precariousness. The 
individual becomes aware of the need to fight to impose oneself, through one’s own 
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means.36 As the respondents affirmed, in today’s world the goal is not to “live” but to 
“survive.”  
In this climate of social instability, combined with ever-increasing needs, the individual 
becomes aware that honor and/or being honorable no longer guarantees a place in the 
world, and that to exist, there is no other choice but to submit to new social requirements. 
In the capitalist society, values are redefined: individuals have to be “seen” by others for 
whatever reason to obtain the social approval. In the contemporary societies, the quest to be 
seen is a necessary part of individual existence and recognition. For this, they have to 
expose themselves to prove to others that they deserve to be recognized.37 The example of 
the use of networks in the digital era can be given here: it has become necessary to “live” in 
that world in order to be “truly alive.” In other words, if you are not viewed, you are among 
the invisible. This feeling is all the more unbearable in a world where social recognition is 
established by views. People want to “stay in view” on the Internet, causing them to “go 
over the top,” by generating a lot of hype so that others will not pass them by. For these 
reasons, many Internet users are eager to stand naked and unveil intimate parts of their 
lives; in the modern world, presentations of the self are no longer based on a private-public 
distinction and they undermine the concept of shame.38 These new values, such as 
exposure, flexibility, and rationality, which come with the capitalist system, seem to be 
incompatible with the principles associated with honor, namely constancy and restraint.39 
That is why honor is no longer a principle assuring recognition and consideration for 
individuals. Today, “being honorable” or acting in an honorable way is not enough to be 
considered as a virtuous person. To obtain the respect of the others, individuals have to be 
seen (for whatever reason), and have to try to exist through their consumption of goods. 
15
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The more they expose themselves and their brands for example, the more they become 
visible and appreciated. Morality is then no longer primordial. In modern society, honor is 
only felt when it is struck, lost or questioned; it is not self-evident. In the perspective of 
social transformations and anxiety engendered by the struggle for survival, it is not 
surprising to see the emergence of entirely negative abstractions symbolizing the loss of 
honor, as if honor could no longer be seen positively.  
Figures of Honorlessness in Contemporary Society: The Homeless and Politicians 
The homeless are the first category cited frequently by French interviewees to incarnate 
the loss of honor. For interviewees, they correspond in the social imagination to individuals 
who no longer have the capacities to participate in the struggle for survival. They are 
marginal both economically and socially. Victims of precariousness and social factures 
forcing them to live in unbearable conditions, they have been destabilized at the very core 
of their own integrity. Following a life crisis that determined their social downfall, begging 
is their only means of survival. The need to depend on others to continue to live necessarily 
requires the individual to put honor aside. This means that begging is always, everywhere, a 
shameful act, an act that implies the loss of personal autonomy, the negation of honor.40 
Indeed, honor belongs to people who are able to fight for their reputation and compete with 
others for their place. Beggars, being by definition in a position of dependence and even 
sometimes of total dependence, cannot take part in exchanges of honor; they are not 
considered as participants in the quest for power. Moreover, already representing the 
ultimate degradation in our society, beggars cannot be humiliated. In this situation, there is 
“no more honor” left to degrade.41  
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Even if the homeless are considered as having lost their honor, respondents displayed 
no negative judgment of them, and even hinted at some empathy. This feeling is revealing 
of common fears in modern society. It seems to suggest that honor can be cast aside when 
the individual is submerged in a precarious situation, without resulting in negative 
judgment from members of society. In this circumstance, shedding honor is not perceived 
as a personal choice or a sign of immorality, but rather as the result of contemporary social 
factors. Socially, begging corresponds to an “imposed” action due to an absence of choices. 
Indeed, respondents frequently noted when talking of someone who has to beg, “He had no 
choice.” Secondly, it seems that the feeling of empathy shown by French interviewees 
towards the homeless is the result of their own anxiety regarding how their own existence 
might be shaken: the homeless are paradigmatic reminders of a situation that threatens all 
individuals. The homeless incarnate both the typical example of an unpredicted breakdown, 
and also a situation in which individuals must avoid at all cost so as not to become “default 
individual(s).”42 The figure of the homeless person makes individuals aware of the fragility 
of their existence and the humiliating situations of contemporary capitalism.43 
  Since the figure of “the homeless person” does not exist in Turkey, no reference to it 
was made. Even though the term “homeless” (“evsiz”) exists in the Turkish language, this 
figure cannot be compared with the one we find in Europe or in America. The first reason is 
that homeless people are not as numerous in Turkey as they are in Europe, for example; 
because of that, they do not represent a social problem taken into consideration by social 
policies, or even by academic researchers like it is in others countries. Moreover, the lack 
of homeless can be explained by the importance of the family ties and the concept of 
shame: in Turkey, kinship is so important that it would be considered as shameful for the 
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whole family to let one of its members live in the street or beg to survive. In Turkey, the 
honor of a member (and by definition the shame as well) is directly connected to the 
community’s one in which the person evolves. That is why, when it is soiled by a certain 
act (in this case, begging), the shame rains down upon the rest of the family. As Sirman 
shows, “it is in these types of societies that honor emerges as both the identity of the person 
vis-à-vis others and the sense of worth that a person has of himself or herself; it is the 
internalized form of a person’s social standing.”44  However, in Turkish discourses, even if 
actual “precariousness” was not mentioned, young adults nonetheless emphasized their 
incertitude when faced with the future. They hoped never to have to beg, never have “to 
hold out their hand,” an act they considered as a sign of destitution and even of dishonor. 
The second figure of honor loss cited by the interviewees is politicians. Whereas the 
homeless are a source of empathy, victims of society’s flaws that threw them into 
precariousness, causing their loss of honor, this is not the case with politicians. Politicians 
represent the second abstraction cited by French and Turkish respondents to designate the 
struggle for survival in which today’s individuals are submerged. According to them, 
politicians represent the part of the population that tried to survive the difficulties of social 
transformations like any other individual, except that they chose to cast aside all ethical 
principles when doing so. They chose to accept a life of confinement to degenerate 
principles that are instrumental to consumer society. The “political figure” symbolizes the 
individual who succeeded in surviving, not by fighting nobly, but by “stepping on others” 
to serve one’s own interests, causing by this same act the loss of honor. This same figure is 
found in Turkish discourses: in Turkey, the typical example of şerefsiz (honorlessness) for 
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the respondents is that of the politician. He represents a selfish person who takes advantage 
of position and power to subjugate others.  
   We can affirm that these two abstractions, that of the homeless and that of the 
politician, represent two figures allowing individuals to situate themselves in society. On 
different levels, they represent examples not to follow. The figure of the homeless 
corresponds to social destitution, the incapacity to struggle to survive, leading to symbolic 
death of the individual. The homeless person has excluded him/herself from social 
relations, and is no longer part of exchanges of power, nor of honor. She/ he is the victim of 
society’s difficulties. The figure of politician represents casting off of morals in favor of 
materialism, fame, and power. These individuals have chosen to meet their own interests to 
the detriment of other members of society. They are characterized by French and Turkish 
interviewees as “without honor,” “without şeref.”  These are counter-examples that should 
not be followed, which help individuals to construct their own principles using reverse 
examples. Honor imposes itself not only as a self-constraining principle, but as a principle 
for survival: with it comes “go-getterness,” a “capacity to talk back, to rebel,” “a 
summersault,” or “an inspiration” in view of attaching oneself to life in order to stay afloat. 
It is the awareness of the sanctity of our being and our existence that makes us react when 
the boundary of what is acceptable is crossed. It promotes self-respect, respect for one’s 
body, but also gives the individual an image and self-esteem to protect. Honor justifies 
what we are fighting for; it gives meaning to our lives. 
However, honor also implies a line of conduct, a set of ethical principles that prevent us 
from biting the hook of gain and fame, to trade “being” for “seeming”. Honor represents 
the will to give oneself principles and morals to avoid being swallowed beneath the ever-
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increasing requirements of consumer society. Honor means saying “no” to alienation, 
reification, contemporary barbarism; it also means refusing primitive impulses, the thirst 
for power, and the loss of self. It is a form of resistance to the contemporary capitalist 
system. Honor corresponds to survival by one’s own means while following a personal 
morality: it is wanting to “confront the precipice”45 and to decide to control our existence 
without being subject to insidious humiliations inflicted by social circumstances, since 
“recognizing barbarism means one can begin to exist.”46 
Conclusion 
  This paper focused on principles of honor and şeref in the Ile-de-France region, which 
includes Paris, and in Istanbul.  It based its conclusions on “representative cases,” 
“fragments” formed from a sample composed of young adults who were twenty to twenty-
seven-years old. Through this comparative work, we have attempted to grasp the place of 
honor, in two societies with different traditions but both now defined by consumer society. 
The aim was to analyze how these two populations situate themselves in regards to their 
respective representations of honor. We have seen that honor, though an ethical principle of 
a given society, is nonetheless a common element in various societies.  Honor can provide a 
specific status and place for individuals in a given society. It allows them to situate 
themselves within the collectivity in which they evolve, claim minimal recognition,47 while 
imposing on them rules of conduct. Any individual refusing to bow to this behavioral code 
demonstrates another sort of honor, qualified as violent, impulsive and even servile.48 In 
addition, this duality in the understanding of honor leads to the emergence of an “Us” and a 
“Them,” which respectively correspond to a “civilized honor” and a “barbarous honor.” 
These divergences determine not only the contours of otherness, but also create 
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geographical naturalizations. Although it has been designated as a “foreign element,” we 
observe that currently, in consumer society, barbarism is an integral part of daily life: it 
takes on the form of civilization itself and is at the heart of the “civilized.” It is through 
brandishing their honor that individuals now attempt to make a place for themselves and to 
exist in their own society. 
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